Experiencing and regulating desire by Hofmann, W. & Van, Dillen L.F.
  
 
 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl 
 
License: Article 25fa pilot End User Agreement 
This publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act (Auteurswet) 
with explicit consent by the author. Dutch law entitles the maker of a short scientific work funded either 
wholly or partially by Dutch public funds to make that work publicly available for no consideration 
following a reasonable period of time after the work was first published, provided that clear reference is 
made to the source of the first publication of the work.  
This publication is distributed under The Association of Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU) ‘Article 
25fa implementation’ pilot project. In this pilot research outputs of researchers employed by Dutch 
Universities that comply with the legal requirements of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act are 
distributed online and free of cost or other barriers in institutional repositories. Research outputs are 
distributed six months after their first online publication in the original published version and with proper 
attribution to the source of the original publication.  
You are permitted to download and use the publication for personal purposes. All rights remain with the 
author(s) and/or copyrights owner(s) of this work. Any use of the publication other than authorised under 
this licence or copyright law is prohibited. 
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, 
please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make 
the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please contact the Library through email: 
OpenAccess@library.leidenuniv.nl  
 
 
Article details 
Hofmann W. & Van Dillen L.F. (2018), Experiencing and regulating desire. In: Zeigler-Hill V., 
Shackelford T.K. (Eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Personality and Individual Differences. Oakland 
USA: SAGE Publications Ltd.. 283-299. 
Experiencing and 
Regulating Desire
W i l h e l m  H o f m a n n  a n d  L o t t e  v a n  D i l l e n
In their everyday lives, people spend a lot of 
time experiencing and dealing with desires of 
all sorts. Examples include innate desires for 
food, drink, sleep, sex, and social connection 
as well as acquired desires such as for alco-
hol, cigarettes, and media. Whereas many 
desires are unproblematic and adaptive, 
sometimes desires can conflict with impor-
tant self-regulatory or moral standards, goals, 
and values. Consider the alcoholic who is 
fully aware of the fact that giving in to the 
desire for another drink at the party he is 
attending will likely impair his ability to 
drive home safely. In addition to personal 
costs (e.g., receiving a ticket for drunk driv-
ing), the societal consequences of poor desire 
regulation can be enormous. According to 
some estimates (Schroeder, 2007), 40% of 
deaths in the United States each year can be 
attributed to behaviors that are at least par-
tially due to the way people (mis)manage 
desires, including those for unhealthy foods, 
tobacco, alcohol, unprotected sex, aggressive 
urges, and illicit drugs. It is therefore 
important to gain a better understanding of 
the psychological mechanisms that contrib-
ute to successful and unsuccessful desire 
regulation. It is clear that some people 
manage the pitfalls of desire better than 
others. So which individual-difference fac-
tors set successful and unsuccessful individu-
als apart from each other?
The present chapter is centered on the 
concept of desire. We will begin with a brief 
definition of desire and draw important links 
between desire and emotion. Next, we sketch 
the dynamical nature of desire and the vari-
ous routes by which it can impact behavior, 
integrating neuroscientific insights. We will 
then provide a tripartite taxonomy of differ-
ent desire-regulation strategies, including 
(a) early-stage preventive strategies such as 
situation control, stimulus control, and early 
distraction; (b) middle-stage down-regulatory 
strategies such as cognitive reappraisal, sup-
pression, and acceptance; and (c) late-stage 
inhibitory strategies and mechanisms such 
as inhibition, overriding, and moderation. 
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This taxonomy is then used in mapping the 
potential effects of various individual differ-
ence variables regarding desire regulation. 
To approach these issues, we will integrate 
insights from the traditional self-control lit-
erature, cognitive psychology, especially 
the elaborated intrusion theory of desire 
(Kavanagh et al., 2005) and executive func-
tioning research, the cognitive neuroscience 
of reward processing, and the field of emo-
tion regulation (e.g., Gross, 1998) – all of 
which are valuable, in our view, in moving 
toward a balanced understanding of desire 
and desire regulation.
DEFINING DESIRE AND RELATED 
CONCEPTS
Because the term desire refers to all kinds of 
wishes and wants in everyday language, 
some clarifications are in order. When we 
speak of ‘desire’ here, we refer to the nar-
rower sphere of appetitive desire, which can 
be defined as a ‘feeling of wanting that pro-
pels us to approach and consume objects or 
otherwise engage in activities that satisfy a 
need and, in doing so, yield a gain in imme-
diate pleasure (or relief from discomfort)’ 
(Hofmann and Nordgren, 2015: 5). Appetitive 
desires are typically rooted in physiological 
need states, such as for food, alcohol, sex, 
rest, or acquired through a history of rein-
forcement learning as in the case of drugs, 
media addiction, spending urges, etc. 
Moreover, we use the term ‘craving’ to refer 
to desires across domains that are particu-
larly high-intensity (e.g., drug craving, food 
craving). It is also important to note that 
‘desire’ and ‘temptation’ are not synony-
mous terms (Hofmann and Kotabe, 2013; 
Hofmann and van Dillen, 2012). Rather, we 
refer to ‘temptation’ as a desire that stands in 
conflict with an important higher-order goal 
or standard. This is highly related to Mele’s 
(2001) point that to say that somebody is 
‘tempted’ by something implies that the 
person has a desire to do X on one hand and 
simultaneously has a good reason not to do 
X, because whether a person has good reason 
not to do X will typically be a function of the 
person’s background set of endorsed self-
regulatory goals, values, or otherwise acti-
vated competing motivations.
Moreover, in this chapter and elsewhere 
(Hofmann and Kotabe, 2013), we draw a 
strong conceptual analogy between desire 
and emotion: similar to emotions, desires 
are multi-faceted phenomena combining 
affective, motivational, and cognitive com-
ponents. Regarding the affective component, 
desires consist of a phenomenological feeling 
of ‘wanting’ of varying intensity. The affec-
tive component has its primary basis in the 
in-the-moment computation of reward value 
that condenses past positive experiences into 
anticipated positive affect.1 Regarding the 
motivational component, desires prepare and 
motivate behavior. Desiring something means 
wanting to have, consume, or do something 
that is expected to yield pleasure (or reduce 
discomfort). Moreover, because desires are 
directed toward certain objects in the envi-
ronment, like emotions, they share a sense 
of ‘aboutness’ (e.g., being happy, sad, angry, 
disgusted about something) that distinguishes 
them from more diffuse affective states such 
as mood (Higgins, 1998). Regarding the cog-
nitive component, there is a close connection 
between desires and desire-related cogni-
tion (mirroring the affect-cognition interface 
of emotion). According to the elaboration-
intrusion theory of desire (Kavanagh et  al., 
2005), desire is typically accompanied by 
intrusive thoughts (including fantasies) about 
the object of desire. Moreover, the inter-
play between the strength of a given desire 
and these cognitions is bi-directional and 
dynamical – as a person engages in more and 
more cognitive elaboration, the strength of 
the desire typically increases and more and 
more mental resources are allocated to it 
in working memory. This is why desires 
can sometimes escalate to the point where 
they fully ‘crowd out’ opposing mental 
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representations such as those of self-regulatory 
goals (Hofmann et al., 2011; Hofmann and van 
Dillen, 2012; Kavanagh et al., 2005).
DESIRE DYNAMICS
What renders some things so attractive that 
they grab attention, occupy thoughts, and 
fuel desire? Theories of desire need to 
address the often complex interplay of stimu-
lus features in the environment and people’s 
inner predispositions (i.e., need states, learn-
ing history) that provide the background 
against which these external stimuli can have 
their powerful effects. Due to the evolution-
ary old nature of these systems, these models 
should be able to account for relatively auto-
matic processes generated by evolutionarily 
old reward-processing regions in the brain 
(e.g., Heatherton and Wagner, 2011). At the 
same time, however, they should be able to 
integrate the previously mentioned idea that 
desire, once emerging in the global work-
space of consciousness, may dynamically 
affect behavior in qualitatively different 
terms through escalatory mechanisms 
(Kavanagh et al., 2005).
We have recently attempted to integrate 
these various aspects into a dynamical model 
of desire (DMD; Hofmann and van Dillen, 
2012), illustrated in Figure 12.1. According 
to the DMD, desire is assumed to emerge 
in a relatively automatic fashion as reward-
processing centers evaluate external stim-
uli against the backdrop of internal need 
states and an individual’s learning history 
(Hofmann et  al., 2009b; Hofmann and van 
Dillen, 2012). The DMD thus predicts that 
strongest reward signals should emerge when 
(a) relevant stimuli are present and relevant 
stimulus features are salient, (b) the respec-
tive need state is high, and (c) the individual 
displays high reward sensitivity with regard 
to that stimulus – an individual predisposi-
tion that can be the result of either genetic 
factors or learning history (or their interplay). 
In a recent set of studies, we found good sup-
port for the predicted three-way interaction 
among stimulus exposure, need state, and 
learning history as a measure of predisposi-
tion (Ghoniem and Hofmann, 2016a).
Early reward processing may have the 
potential to bias attention (e.g., Vollstädt-
Klein et  al., 2012) and trigger fast, impul-
sive, and habitual responses that may even 
happen outside of conscious awareness 
Figure 12.1 A dynamical model of desire proposed by Hofmann and van Dillen (2012;  
adapted and reprinted with permission)
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(e.g., Mogenson et  al., 1980; Winkielman 
et al., 2005). Such impulsive responses may 
be most impactful in situations where the 
desired stimulus is already quite close in 
space and time (see Figure 12.1, lower path-
way). However, desire may also gain access 
to consciousness and thereby deeply influ-
ence thinking and planning even when there 
is no direct opportunity for giving in to the 
desire. In case enough attention is allocated 
to it, desire may emerge into consciousness, 
thus occupying limited working memory 
resources. As a given desire attracts further 
attention, a ‘vicious cycle’ of reprocessing 
and rumination can result, during which 
people repeatedly imagine desire enactment 
and have recurring thoughts about the result-
ing pleasurable experience (Kavanagh et al., 
2005). This is a vicious cycle inasmuch as 
cognitive elaborations can, in turn, increase 
the feeling of wanting and the motivational 
power of desire. As desire becomes more 
cognitively elaborated in working memory, 
so does its potential to instigate concrete 
action plans and behavioral intentions to 
consume the object of desire (see Figure 12.1, 
upper pathway). Crucially therefore, elabo-
rated desires may predispose the organism 
toward (sometimes problematic) consump-
tion via two important mechanisms. First, 
elaborated desires may crowd out (i.e., tem-
porarily deactivate) other representations 
from working memory, leading to a preoc-
cupation with the desire at the expense of 
everything else, including self-regulatory 
goals and values (Hofmann et  al., 2011; 
Kemps et  al., 2008a). Second, elaborated 
desires may instigate processes of motivated 
reasoning that license and justify indul-
gence (e.g., ‘I worked so hard today that I 
deserve a special treat’; ‘Others are having 
an ice cream, too’; ‘This is definitely going 
to be my last drink before I quit!’) (De 
Witt Huberts et  al., 2012, 2014; Hofmann 
and van Dillen, 2012). It is via these 
 cognitive-motivational processes underlying 
desire escalation – thus ‘hijacking’ behav-
ior through the same executive mechanisms 
that may otherwise support reasoned 
action – that desire may lead to passionate 
behavior that people later regret.
The introduced model places some 
emphasis on the emergence of desire, rather 
than just the regulation thereof. We have 
repeatedly argued that both motivational 
‘forces’ – desire strength and the restrain-
ing force – are important in understanding 
the dynamics of desire regulation and self- 
control (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2009b; Kotabe 
and Hofmann, 2015). From this perspective, 
it is important to better understand individual- 
difference variables affecting the intensity 
of desire experiences. For instance, there is 
substantial evidence that individuals high in 
Behavioral Approach System (BAS) sensi-
tivity experience stronger desires and crav-
ings on average than those low in BAS. This 
effect on reward sensitivity was found both 
in cue-reactivity paradigms in the laboratory 
(Franken, 2002) and also when aggregating 
average self-reported desire strength across 
many desire domains (Hofmann, Baumeister 
et al., 2012). These findings clearly support 
Gray’s (1982) Reinforcement Sensitivity 
Theory arguing that the BAS is responsi-
ble for the reward processing in appetitive 
motivation and suggest an important role for 
related constructs such as sensation seeking.
From a neuroscientific perspective, such 
differences in desire strength appear to 
be based on activity in largely subcortical 
neural regions that include the mesolimbic 
dopamine system and which are equally 
responsive to natural rewards like food and 
sex, cocaine, or gambling (Kelley et  al., 
2005). On the one hand, hypo- dopaminergic 
functioning has been thought to invoke 
deficiencies in reward responsiveness and 
to underlie a range of addictions includ-
ing alcoholism, cocaine abuse, pathological 
gambling, and the development of obesity, 
as people seek out more extreme thrills to 
compensate (Bowirrat and Oscar-Berman, 
2005; Wang et al., 2004). On the other hand, 
enhanced dopamine functioning has been 
found to elicit strong appetitive responses. 
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For instance, amplification of the dopamine 
signal in human participants via a small 
dose of oral methylphenidate increased their 
desire to eat in response to a palatable food 
cue (Volkow et al., 2002). Whether linked to 
hypo- or hyper-dopaminergic functioning, it 
has, however, become clear that reward sen-
sitivity deficiencies play an important role in 
the emergence of pathological desires that 
play a role in obesity, substance abuse, and 
gambling (for a more detailed discussion of 
hypo- versus hyper-responsivity in relation 
to obesity, see Stice et al., 2009).
Of particular interest, the nucleus accum-
bens (NAcc) in the ventral striatum seems 
to be implicated in the generation of want-
ing experiences (Berridge et al., 2009; Peciña 
and Berridge, 2005). For instance, one study 
connecting laboratory brain data and eve-
ryday life desire experiences, showed that 
individual differences in NAcc activity dur-
ing exposure to food cues in the scanner were 
reliably related to the average strength of 
food desires in people’s everyday environ-
ments, as measured via experience-sampling 
(Lopez et al., 2014). Likewise, another study 
demonstrated that individual differences in 
NAcc responsivity to food and sexual pictures 
predicted subsequent weight gain and sexual 
activity six months later (Demos et al., 2012). 
Neural responses to oral calories in reward-
related brain areas have also been found to 
relate positively to individual differences in 
reward sensitivity as measured by the BAS 
scale (van Rijn et al., 2015), and individual 
differences in food reward sensitivity have 
been found to predict enhanced NAcc activ-
ity in response to high-calorie compared to 
low-calorie food images (van Dillen and van 
Steenbergen, 2018).
One possible answer for such individual 
differences in general or domain-specific dif-
ferences in reward sensitivity may be found 
in genetic differences. The presence of the 
A1 allele of the Taq1A gene has, for example, 
been linked to lower density of D2 dopamine 
receptors, which is thought to underlie hypo-
responsiveness to reward as observed in the 
abuse of cocaine (Goldstein et al., 2007) and 
alcohol (Martinez et al., 2005). In one neuro-
imaging study, moreover, presence of the A1 
allele moderated the relation between abnor-
mal dorsal striatum activation in response to 
food receipt and weight gain over the sub-
sequent one-year period (Stice et al., 2009). 
Another answer for differences in reward 
sensitivity may be found in different learn-
ing histories through which people acquire 
learned expectancies that a given stimulus 
will provide pleasurable, rewarding experi-
ences or relief from discomfort (as is often 
the case in addiction). Similar to the presence 
of the A1 allele for example, animal studies 
have shown that repeated intake of sweet and 
fatty foods reduces the density and sensitivity 
of post-synaptic D2 receptors (Warwick and 
Synowski, 1999).
WHY REGULATE DESIRES?
On the one hand, desires are key motivators, 
often rooted in evolutionary old systems that 
secure one’s own survival as well as the sur-
vival of the species. On the other hand, there 
is a multitude of good reasons for why 
people are often motivated to regulate their 
desires. At a general level, the unfettered 
expression of desire can either be self- 
harming or interfere with the well-being of 
fellow citizens (or both). For instance, exces-
sive alcohol consumption may not only harm 
one’s own body, but also have a disintegrat-
ing effect on one’s family members (e.g., 
impulsive acts of family violence, failing to 
maintain a job). The capacity to regulate 
desire is a prerequisite for participating in 
society, and those who chronically fail to 
regulate their desires such as aggressive and 
sexual urges often find themselves removed 
from free society. Not surprisingly, legal, 
religious, and educational systems are all 
involved in the regulation of problematic 
desires. The ideal goal of such regulative 
attempts is to establish a consensual balance 
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between individual liberty and collective 
interests, including public safety, order, 
and health.
But even beyond those institutionalized 
normative influences, there are often addi-
tional moral, health-related, or financial con-
siderations that keep desires at bay. According 
to moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 
2013), for instance, morality is based on sev-
eral core moral principles: Care (i.e., ‘don’t 
harm other people’), Fairness (i.e., ‘don’t 
pursue your own advantage in dispropor-
tionate ways’), Loyalty (i.e., ‘don’t betray 
your in-group’); Authority (i.e., ‘don’t dis-
respect laws, rules, and authority figures’), 
and Sanctity (i.e., ‘don’t do something 
‘impure’ or ‘indecent’). Another, separable 
core moral principle may be Honesty (i.e., 
‘don’t manipulate the truth’; Hofmann et al., 
2014). Each of these principles can serve as a 
moral reason of desire regulation, and, in fact, 
self-control goals often appear to be moral-
ized (e.g., Haidt and Hersh, 2001; Rozin and 
Singh, 1999). An intriguing question in this 
context is whether self-regulatory goals that 
are moralized may be more effective than 
self-regulatory goals that do not have that 
additional moral ingredient, and some initial 
evidence seems to support this (Hosey, 2014; 
Rozin et al., 1997). Furthermore, are some of 
these moral reasons/dimensions more effec-
tive than others?
Clearly, individuals differ in the extent 
to which they endorse self-regulatory goals 
(such as health goals), as well as the differ-
ent dimensions of morality that may support 
moralization of a given desire-related behav-
ior (Graham et  al., 2011). Of further rel-
evance are traits/values relating to the degree 
to which people may see a need to regulate 
desires that other people may regard as prob-
lematic. Such different ‘thresholds’ for the 
problematic aspects of desire enactment may, 
for instance, be related to the endorsement 
of hedonism-related values (Ghoniem and 
Hofmann, 2016b), or to a pronounced sense 
of entitlement to rewards and other things 
(Hofmann, Baumeister et al., 2012).
MECHANISMS OF DESIRE 
REGULATION
Given that desire is sometimes problematic, 
how can it be effectively self-regulated in 
accordance with self-regulatory goals and 
values? We propose that there are roughly 
three main types of desire-regulation mecha-
nisms (see also Hofmann and Vohs, 2016): 
(1) those that constrain the emergence of 
desire, (2) those that help down-regulate 
desire experience (i.e., desire intensity), and 
(3) those that enable inhibition or overriding 
of the action tendency implied by the desire.
Constraining Desire
The first class of desire-regulation strategies 
encompasses early-stage strategies that may 
prevent an individual from experiencing an 
unwelcome desire. This class represents the 
fact that people can play an active part with 
regard to the types of situations and stimuli 
they encounter in their day-to-day lives. If 
successful, these strategies typically render 
middle- and late-stage desire regulation 
unnecessary. It should be noted, however, 
that these preventive strategies may require 
considerable foresight, understanding, and 
experience concerning which situations and 
stimuli are likely to trigger problematic 
desire. As people extract lessons from their 
past behavior (Baumeister et al., 2007), they 
may become increasingly better at avoiding 
problematic desire.
Situation selection and stimulus 
control
The most effective strategy to prevent desire 
is to avoid exposure to tempting situations or 
stimuli altogether through strategies of situa-
tion selection and stimulus control (Mahoney 
and Thoresen, 1972). Based on the assump-
tion that external stimuli play a seminal role 
in the generation of desire (Hofmann and van 
Dillen, 2012), such strategies can greatly 
alter the odds that people will experience 
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temptation in the first place (Fujita, 2011; 
Hofmann and Kotabe, 2012). Situation and 
stimulus control techniques may not only be 
applied by the self-regulator directly (e.g., 
keeping one’s refrigerator free of alcohol) 
but also be imposed through so-called 
‘nudges’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009), which 
have become a major area of interest at the 
intersection of public policy and health. The 
use of situation and stimulus control can be 
seen, for example, in ‘no smoking’ policies 
at restaurants and at school cafeterias that 
primarily offer healthy options (e.g., Hanks 
et al., 2012). Because situation and stimulus 
control are not always feasible, such as when 
one cannot escape a temptation-rich environ-
ment, they cannot be the only means of effec-
tive desire regulation.
The Everyday Temptations Study (Hofmann, 
Baumeister et  al., 2012) showed that indi-
viduals high in trait self-control (TSC) 
reported lower average desire strength (as 
well as lower average conflict and less use 
of active resistance to control desire). This 
pattern of findings can be interpreted as 
high TSC individuals making more use of 
preventive situation and stimulus control 
strategies, thus avoiding tempting desires 
more often than their low TSC counterparts 
(and hence reducing the need for effort-
ful control). In support, independent raters 
rated the desires reported by high TSC par-
ticipants as less problematic for the ‘aver-
age person’ than the desires reported by low 
TSC participants (Hofmann, Baumeister 
et al., 2012). These findings are intriguing 
as they suggest that TSC may not so much 
be about how well temptations are resisted 
(the type of ‘late-stage’ self-control typi-
cally studied in the laboratory situations), 
but also about how well temptations are 
being avoided or appraised at early stages 
in the self-control process.
Early-stage distraction
Another, more proximal, mechanism than 
situation and stimulus control that appears to 
constrain the potential for desire experience 
is early-stage distraction. The underlying 
idea is that, sometimes, people may be so 
focused on a given current goal or activity 
(e.g., reading an engaging novel) that tempt-
ing stimuli in their environment do not cap-
ture enough attention anymore that would 
otherwise lead to the conscious representa-
tion (and reprocessing) of desire in working 
memory. Indeed, recent research has shown 
that cognitively demanding tasks (unrelated 
to the temptation at hand) can reduce or 
eliminate the experience of desire (Kemps 
et al., 2008b), even for people easily tempted 
by (food) rewards in their environment (van 
Dillen et  al., 2013). Accordingly, more 
applied work has shown that distraction may 
therefore have high potential for craving 
interventions (Florsheim et  al., 2008; 
Skorka-Brown et  al., 2014; van Dillen and 
Andrade, 2016).
However, this strategy may only work to 
the extent that such powerful distractors can 
be easily found and are applied before strong 
cravings can be enacted, as some research 
suggests possible detrimental effects of dis-
traction at later stages, especially when actual 
behavioral control is required (Friese et al., 
2008; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999). However, 
this does not mean that attentional distraction 
is no longer effective once a desirable stimu-
lus has been encountered and evaluated as 
such. For example, even when strong (food) 
cravings have already been induced, cogni-
tive distractions can still downplay these 
cravings and subsequent impulsive choices 
(van Dillen and Andrade, 2016). We argue, 
however, that with ongoing cognitive elabo-
rations in working memory, desires gain 
more and more potential to trigger actual 
behaviors, which should make attentional 
distraction – and arguably most other strate-
gies aimed at reducing desire strength – less 
effective with time proceeding.
Individuals also differ considerably in 
their command of top-down attention. In the 
cognitive literature on executive functioning, 
top-down attention has been strongly linked 
with the concept of working memory capacity 
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(WMC; Kane et al., 2001). WMC represents 
the ability to maintain and update relevant 
information in working memory and shield 
it from interfering processing or distraction 
(Engle, 2002; Kane et al., 2001). WMC may 
help people disengage faster from attention-
grabbing desire-related cues, thus being less 
influenced by those cues. Eye-tracking stud-
ies, for instance, have shown that people 
low in WMC are prone to bias eye direction 
toward tempting cues, with the degree of 
bias correlating with their automatic affec-
tive reactions toward those cues (Friese et al., 
2010; Friese and Hofmann, 2012). Those 
high in WMC, in contrast, were much less 
influenced by their automatic affective reac-
tions, suggesting that they were faster at dis-
engaging attention from salient cues.
In a related-vein, theorists have pointed out 
the importance of the involvement of prefron-
tal cortical regions in self-control (Heatherton 
and Wagner, 2011). These models have been 
supported by neuroimaging studies showing 
that participants instructed to inhibit cravings 
for drugs (Volkow et al., 2010) or cigarettes 
(Brody et  al., 2007) display increased activ-
ity in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and that the 
extent of this increase is associated with self-
control at the behavioral level and reduced 
cue-reactivity in regions associated with 
reward processing such as the ventral striatum. 
An important question is to what extent these 
fronto-striatal interactions reflect actual down-
regulation, or the absence of up-regulation 
of NAcc by the dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC). 
Whereas the DLPFC has been argued to play 
an important role in self-control processes 
(Hare et al., 2009; Wagner et al., 2013), stud-
ies have also pointed to its involvement in 
the further elaboration of motivationally rel-
evant cues (Erk et al., 2007; van Dillen et al., 
2009; for a review, see Goldstein and Volkow, 
2011). Combining transcranial magnetic stim-
ulation and functional magnetic resonance 
imaging, Hayashi et al. (2013) have demon-
strated that the DLPFC modulates craving in 
response to changes in intertemporal avail-
ability. Subjective craving was greater when 
cigarettes were immediately available, and 
this effect was eliminated by transiently inacti-
vating the DLPFC with transcranial magnetic 
stimulation. Inactivation of the DLPFC also 
reduced craving-related signals in the anterior 
cingulate and ventral striatum – areas impli-
cated in transforming value signals into action 
(Walton et al., 2004). These findings indicate 
that the DLPFC is involved in the build-up of 
value signals based on contextual knowledge, 
as much as it down-regulates value signals in 
the service of overarching goals.
Down-Regulation of Desire 
Experience
The second class of desire-regulation strate-
gies encompasses those that may down- 
regulate desire. In this case, desire is 
experienced and a prepotent action tendency 
may be activated, but the focus of regulation 
is on the desire experience rather than on the 
prepotent action tendency. The idea is that 
certain regulatory strategies may be more 
effective than others at reducing the intensity 
of the experienced desire. Just as a growing 
fire can be reduced in its power through the 
right strategy (e.g., repeatedly pouring buck-
ets of water over it), and eventually be extin-
guished, desire may be reduced below a 
critical level and eventually fade as the indi-
vidual employs the right mental strategy at the 
right moment. This analogy implies that each 
regulatory strategy may have its advantages 
and disadvantages, and that aspects of the 
stimulus, context, and perceiver all determine 
which strategy is most useful at some point.
Cognitive reappraisal
One way that desire down-regulation can be 
brought about is through strategies that modify 
how a tempting stimulus is appraised. 
Reappraisal is the term used to indicate mental 
strategies that alter how people perceive an 
event, idea, or feeling (see also Gross, 1998). 
Walter Mischel’s groundbreaking work on 
delay of gratification has shown that young 
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children are better able to resist immediate 
rewards if they learn to reappraise these 
rewards in non-consummatory ways (Mischel 
and Baker, 1975). Presumably, such strategies 
can reduce the immediate appeal of tempting 
stimuli. Recent research applying this idea to 
adults has demonstrated that cognitive reap-
praisal can have a profound impact on affec-
tive reactions to tempting stimuli. For instance, 
having people imagine tempting stimuli in 
non-consummatory ways appears to reduce 
people’s automatic evaluation of these stimuli 
(Hofmann et al., 2010). Research using vari-
ous reappraisal techniques, such as thinking 
about the negative consequences of enacting 
desire (Hollmann et  al., 2012; Kober et  al., 
2010), or a combination of reappraisal tech-
niques (Giuliani et  al., 2014) provides con-
verging evidence that cognitive reappraisal is 
generally effective in down-regulating self-
reported desires and cravings.
Individuals differ in their use of emotion-
regulation strategies such as cognitive reap-
praisal (Gross and John, 2003), and the 
effective use of this strategy has been linked 
to individual differences in WMC (Hofmann, 
Schmeichel et al., 2012; McRae et al., 2012; 
Schmeichel et al., 2008). It thus seems straight-
forward to assume that people high in chronic 
reappraisal strategy use should have an easier 
time down-regulating problematic desire than 
those low in this tendency, even though more 
direct individual-differences research linking 
the two appears missing so far.
However, emotion regulation research has 
examined the conditions under which people 
choose to employ reappraisal (as compared 
to distraction). These findings suggest that 
although reappraisal tends to be more benefi-
cial for long-term adaptation, people choose 
to reappraise especially in response to mildly 
intense emotional stimuli. In contrast, peo-
ple prefer distraction in response to strongly 
intense emotional stimuli. This preference is 
likely explained by the finding that compared 
to reappraisal, distraction requires less cogni-
tive effort (as evidenced by reduced skin con-
ductance and effort-related brain potentials) 
and more effectively deals with the material’s 
immediate impact, as evidenced by reduced 
self-reported negative emotions and neural 
indices of emotion-processing (Shafir et al., 
2015; Sheppes et  al., 2009; Sheppes and 
Meiran, 2008). Reappraisal, compared to 
distraction, however, has been shown to have 
fewer information-processing costs (e.g., 
reduced memory of the material; Kron et al., 
2010; Sheppes and Meiran, 2008) and allows 
the person to make sense of the emotional 
event. Clearly, these different strategies have 
different implications depending on the situ-
ation, and individuals incorporate these in 
their regulation choices. Whereas no research 
has yet looked into the choices people make 
to down-regulate desires of varying intensi-
ties, a similar logic might apply.
Suppression
In contrast to the reappraisal literature, the 
distinct strategy of trying to simply suppress 
emotion and accompanying thoughts does not 
seem to fare as well. There is a large body of 
general emotion regulation research showing 
that suppression is generally ineffective, if not 
maladaptive (Gross and Levenson, 1993; Webb 
et al., 2012). The related literature on appeti-
tive thought suppression comes to the same 
conclusion (Barnes and Tantleff-Dunn, 2010; 
Erskine, 2008; Johnston et al., 1999; Mann and 
Ward, 2001). Thought suppression seems to 
heighten levels of craving, and binge behavior. 
Somewhat ironically, thought suppression may 
backfire (Wegner, 1994). According to 
Wegner’s theory, when trying to actively sup-
press something, attention may be repeatedly 
redirected toward the mental content one tries 
to avoid. This feature of suppression may con-
tribute to keeping the desire-processing loop 
alive, or even leading to the hyper-accessibility 
of desire-related thoughts. In one study that 
addressed the effect of spontaneous instances 
of suppression on later craving rebounds, 
 nicotine-deprived heavy smoking participants 
who displayed suppression-related facial 
expressions during cue exposure (lighting and 
holding the lit cigarette for thirty seconds) 
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subsequently valued smoking more than those 
who did not show these expressions (Sayers 
and Sayette, 2013).
Individuals differ with regard to the pro-
pensity to use suppression as a regulatory 
strategy (Gross and John, 2003). On average, 
those reverting to this strategy more often 
than others may be more likely to fail in 
down-regulating their desires and cravings. 
For instance, (dysfunctional) perfectionists 
appear to focus too much on suppression as 
a regulatory strategy (Bergman et al., 2007). 
They may thus become overly obsessed with 
their (problematic) desires. This speculative 
idea is supported by the finding that people 
high in dysfunctional perfectionism reported 
stronger desire intensity in the Everyday 
Temptations Study (Hofmann, Baumeister, 
et  al., 2012). Nonetheless, it is important 
to note that some emotion suppressors may 
be more effective than others because some 
research suggests that individuals high in 
WMC seem to be (relatively) better at sup-
pressing unwanted thoughts, as indicated by 
fewer thought intrusions (Brewin and Smart, 
2005; Kane et al., 2007).
Inhibition/Overriding
The third class of desire-regulation strategies 
encompasses those abilities and strategies 
that enable the effective inhibition or over-
riding of the actual desire-related behavior. 
In this case, a problematic desire is experi-
enced, a prepotent action tendency has 
already been activated, and the situation 
allows for the enactment of the behavior. The 
focus of this strategy is on preventing or 
limiting the impact of the action tendency on 
actual behavior (rather than on down- 
regulating the desire). The basic assumption 
underlying inhibition/overriding is that either 
through automatic activation or hijacked 
executive mechanisms (typically used for 
self-regulation; see above), desire may acti-
vate prepotent action tendencies. Unless 
inhibited or overridden, these tendencies 
may be expressed in overt behavior once a 
certain threshold of activation is reached 
(Norman and Shallice, 1986; Strack and 
Deutsch, 2004). Thus, inhibition/overriding 
requires that the individual manages to keep 
that prepotent action tendency from influ-
encing behavior for as long as the tempting 
episode lasts. For successful inhibition/over-
riding to take place, the individual therefore 
needs to be both motivated enough to recruit 
the required executive functions and possess 
enough capacity to successfully keep the 
activation of desire-related action tendencies 
below a critical threshold (Kotabe and 
Hofmann, 2015). The fact that both motiva-
tion and ability need to be present in order 
for this strategy to be effective means that it 
is often a difficult endeavor.
A wealth of cognitive experimental 
research has linked the capacity aspect of 
behavioral inhibition and response overrid-
ing to individual differences in the inhibi-
tory control facet of executive functioning 
(for a review, see Hofmann, Schmeichel 
et  al., 2012; Miyake et  al., 2000). Poor 
inhibitory control has been implicated in a 
large number of impulse-control problems 
including dietary failures (Hofmann et  al., 
2013; Nederkoorn et  al., 2010), drug use 
and abuse (Berkman et al., 2011; Nigg et al., 
2006), inappropriate social responding (von 
Hippel and Gonsalkorale, 2005), and sexual 
cheating in romantic relationships (Pronk 
et al., 2011). Moreover, many studies across 
these diverse domains have demonstrated 
that people low in behavioral inhibition 
are more strongly influenced by prepotent 
action tendencies than those high in inhibi-
tion (e.g., Hofmann et  al., 2009a; Houben 
and Wiers, 2009; Nederkoorn et  al., 2010; 
Payne, 2005), providing more evidence for 
the underlying mechanism. But inhibitory 
control skills may also protect individuals 
who show greater than average reward sensi-
tivity. In one study, for example, higher food 
reward sensitivity predicted greater palat-
able food intake at low levels of inhibitory 
control, but was not associated with intake at 
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high levels of inhibitory control (Appelhans 
et al., 2011).
From a neuroscientific perspective, recent 
advances in methodology have enabled 
researchers to not only look at activity in 
certain areas of the brain, but, rather, at the 
degree of coupling or functional connectiv-
ity among different brain regions, allowing 
for a more comprehensive understanding of 
control dynamics. Of particular interest for 
desire regulation is the connection between 
mesolimibic structures, such as the NAcc 
and prefrontal regions of the brain, assumed 
to subserve the control of action (Heatherton 
and Wagner, 2011), and already discussed 
in relation to desire strength. Interestingly, 
some first findings suggest that individual 
differences in impulsivity, as measured via 
trait impulsivity self-report measures or 
through behavioral choice tasks that require 
balancing desire and reason, may be related 
to the degree of functional connectivity 
between NAcc and PFC regions (Diekhof 
and Gruber, 2010). Specifically, individuals 
high in impulsivity appear to show a stronger 
coupling between reward-processing centers 
and PFC regions, and increased responsivity 
in NAcc to potential rewards, possibly sug-
gesting more bottom-up impact of desire on 
conscious reward representations and action 
control. Connectivity between these regions 
was also inversely related to behavioral suc-
cess (rejecting the reward). In line with this, 
those low in impulsivity show a stronger dis-
connect between ‘wanting’ and ‘reasoned 
action’, as well as reduced NAcc responsiv-
ity to reward, which can be interpreted as 
greater behavioral flexibility, including the 
increased ability to not act on immediate 
desire (Diekhof and Gruber, 2010).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Appetitive desires are common because 
people spend about half of their waking time 
desiring certain things (Hofmann, Baumeister 
et  al., 2012). They are deeply connected to 
the needs that have secured the species’ sur-
vival over millennia. Yet, with desire comes 
the potential for mental conflict and the need 
to regulate in accordance with individual, 
social, and societal enactment constraints. 
Whatever the source of such inner conflict, 
humans are, by and large, remarkably effec-
tive desire regulators (Hofmann, Baumeister, 
et al., 2012). At the same time, there is room 
for improvement – as a quick look into con-
temporary societal problems such as overeat-
ing, over-drinking, smoking, or sexually 
transmitted diseases confirms.
We have argued that effective desire 
regulation, just as emotion regulation, can 
take many forms and unfold at various time 
points. Desire-regulation strategies can 
roughly be classified into early-stage strate-
gies that proactively constrain desire experi-
ences;  middle-stage strategies that support 
the effective down-regulation of consciously-
experienced desire; and late-stage strate-
gies that involve the inhibition, overriding, 
or moderation of desire-related behavior. 
These distinctions are difficult to demarcate 
exactly, however, and what is the right strat-
egy depends on the moment, the situation, 
and the individual.
We have also argued that individuals differ 
as to how intensely they experience desire and 
how they go about regulating it. To recap the 
most central insights: individuals with particu-
larly sensitive reward centers appear to experi-
ence stronger desires and individuals high in 
TSC seem to make more use of early preventive 
strategies such as situation and stimulus con-
trol. Being dispositionally high in WMC may 
make it a lot easier to resist the attentional pull 
of tempting stimuli and to reappraise tempt-
ing situations. Being high in inhibitory control 
capacities aids people in keeping impulsive 
action tendencies in check. Taking a closer 
look at what strategies work for what types of 
people should help practitioners to devise more 
effective customized treatments for those who 
suffer from tempting desires and cravings. As 
technological possibilities mature, we expect 
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to see fascinating new developments in the 
years to come with regard to one of the central 
challenges of what it means to be human: how 
to shape one’s internal landscape of appetitive 
desires in a way that strikes a healthy balance 
between desire enactment and the occasional 
need to curb one’s passion for what might be a 
pretty good reason.
As psychological and neurocognitive 
insights into desire and desire regulation 
mature, new treatment methods and technol-
ogies will surely emerge. Applied research is 
likely to profit from these insights and will 
make progress in helping those individuals 
deal with problematic desires who, according 
to our analysis, are in the strongest need for 
external support and decision aids: those with 
above-average desire experiences and those 
with particularly poor emotion regulation and 
behavioral inhibition abilities.
Note
 1 However, additional (negative) evaluations may 
be added on top of this base affective compo-
nent, leading to the well-known ambivalence of 
desire experiences (Kavanagh et  al., 2005; van 
Harreveld et  al., 2016). Furthermore, although 
enacting or thwarting desires may have certain 
self-conscious emotional consequences such as 
guilt, we view such emotional consequences as 
separable from the distinct, intrinsic phenome-
nology of desire, which is grounded in the antici-
pation of rewarding experiences.
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